Advanced Microeconomics

This textbook for master programs in economics offers a comprehensive overview of microeconomics. It employs a carefully graded approach where basic game theory concepts are already explained within the simpler decision framework. The unavoidable mathematical content is supplied when needed, not in an appendix. The book covers a lot of ground, from decision theory to game theory, from bargaining to auction theory, from household theory to oligopoly theory, and from the theory of general equilibrium to regulation theory. Additionally, cooperative game theory is introduced. This textbook has been recommended and developed for university courses in Germany, Austria and Switzerland. Content Basic decision and preference theory Household theory and theory of the firm Games and industrial organization Bargaining theory and Pareto optimality Bayesian games and mechanism design Perfect competition and competition policy Contracts and principal-agent theories The author Prof. Dr. Harald Wiese holds the Chair of Microeconomics at the University of Leipzig.

Description based upon print version of record.

2.3. Expected utility as a resolution?

Intro -- Preface -- Contents -- CHAPTER I. Cooperation as the central focus of microeconomics -- 1. Three modes of cooperation -- 1.1. Decentral mechanism. -- 1.2. Bargaining. -- 1.3. Dictatorship. -- 2. This book -- 2.1. Overview. -- 2.2. Concept. -- Part A. Basic decision and preference theory -- CHAPTER II. Decisions in strategic form -- 1. Introduction and three examples -- 2. Sets, functions, and real numbers -- 2.1. Sets, tuples, and Cartesian products. -- 2.2. Injective and surjective functions. -- 2.3. Real numbers. -- 3. Dominance and best responses -- 4. Mixed strategies and beliefs

4.1. Probability distribution. -- 4.2. Mixing strategies and states of the world. -- 4.3. Extending payoff definitions. -- 4.4. Four different best-response functions. -- 5. Rationalizability -- 6. Topics and literature -- 7. Solutions -- 8. Further exercises without solutions -- CHAPTER III. Decisions in extensive form -- 1. Introduction and two examples -- 2. Decision trees and actions -- 2.1. Perfect information. -- 2.2. Imperfect information. -- 3. Strategies and subtrees: perfect information -- 3.1. Strategies. -- 3.2. Subtrees and subtree perfection.

3.3. Backward induction for perfec…