Conspiracy Theories: the Philosophical Debate

Conspiracy theories have a bad reputation. In the past, most philosophers have ignored the topic, vaguely supposing that conspiracy theories are obviously irrational and that they can be easily dismissed. The current philosophical interest in the subject results from a realisation that this is not so. Some philosophers have taken up the challenge of identifying and explaining the flaws of conspiracy theories. Other philosophers have argued that conspiracy theories do not deserve their bad reputation, and that conspiracy theorists do not deserve their reputation for irrationality. This book represents both sides of this important debate. Aimed at a broad philosophical community, including epistemologists, political philosophers, and philosophers of history. It represents a significant contribution to the growing interdisciplinary debate about conspiracy theories.

Cover; Half Title; Dedication; Title Page; Copyright Page; Table of Contents; List of Contributors; Foreword; 1: An Introduction to the Philosophical Debate about Conspiracy Theories; 2: The Conspiracy Theory of Society; 3: Popper Revisited, or What is Wrong with Conspiracy Theories?; 4: Of Conspiracy Theories; 5: Living with the Conspiracy; 6: Conspiracy Theories and Conspiracy Theorizing; 7: Malevolent Global Conspiracy; 8: Nobody Expects the Spanish Inquisition! More Thoughts on Conspiracy Theory; 9: Conspiracy Theories and Official Stories

10: Appealing to the Fundamental Attribution Error: Was it All a Big Mistake?11: Afterthoughts on Conspiracy Theory: Resilience and Ubiquity; 12: Complots of Mischief; 13: The Pragmatic Rejection of Conspiracy Theories; Index