Epistemic luck

by Pritchard, Duncan

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Title Statements

Full title :Epistemic luck / Duncan Pritchard.

Summary

One of the key supposed 'platitudes' of contemporary epistemology is the claim that knowledge excludes luck. One can see the attraction of such a claim, in that knowledge is something that one can take credit for; it is an achievement of sorts, and yet luck undermines genuine achievements. The problem, however, is that luck seems to be an all-pervasive feature of our epistemic enterprises that tempts us to think that either scepticism is true, and we don't know very much after all, or else knowledge is compatible with knowledge after all. My claim is that we do not need to choose between these two austere alternatives, since a closer inspection of what is involved in the notion of epistemic luck reveals varieties of luck that are compatible with knowledge possession and varieties that aren't. We can thus do justice to the intuition that knowledge is compatible with (some forms of) luck without acceding to the sceptical claim that we do not know as much as we think we do. Nevertheless, I also claim that there is a sceptical problem lurking in the background that is related to the problem of epistemic luck, though it is not best thought of in terms of the possession of knowledge.

Edition Statements

Publication Date:2005.

Publication Statements

Publisher(s):Oxford University Press
Place of Publication:New York
Language:eng
Publication Date:2005.

The Physical Object

Description:1 online resource (xiii, 290 pages)

Edition Identifiers

ISBN:019928038X, 9780199280384, 9781435621978, 1435621972
oclc:ocn206933987
LC Classification:BF447
Dewey Decimal:121

Scepticism in contemporary debate -- Closure and context -- Neo-Mooreanism -- The source of scepticism -- Luck -- Two varieties of epistemic luck -- Cognitive responsibility and epistemic virtues -- Scepticism and epistemic luck -- Epistemic angst -- Postscript: moral luck.