Evolutionary game theory
This text introduces current evolutionary game theory--where ideas from evolutionary biology and rationalistic economics meet--emphasizing the links between static and dynamic approaches and noncooperative game theory. Much of the text is devoted to the key concepts of evolutionary stability and replicator dynamics. The former highlights the role of mutations and the latter the mechanisms of selection. Moreover, set-valued static and dynamic stability concepts, as well as processes of social ev…
Read More ↓Title Statements
- Full title :Evolutionary game theory / Jörgen W. Weibull.
Summary
This text introduces current evolutionary game theory--where ideas from evolutionary biology and rationalistic economics meet--emphasizing the links between static and dynamic approaches and noncooperative game theory. Much of the text is devoted to the key concepts of evolutionary stability and replicator dynamics. The former highlights the role of mutations and the latter the mechanisms of selection. Moreover, set-valued static and dynamic stability concepts, as well as processes of social evolution, are discussed. Separate background chapters are devoted to noncooperative game theory and the theory of ordinary differential equations. There are examples throughout as well as individual chapter summaries.
Read More ↓Edition Statements
- Publication Date:cop. 1995.
- Edition:4th print
Publication Statements
- Publisher(s):MIT Press
- Place of Publication:Cambridge (Mass.)
- Language:eng
- Publication Date:cop. 1995.
The Physical Object
- Description:1 vol. (XV-265 p.) ; : 24 cm
Edition Identifiers
- ISBN:0262731215, 0262231816, 9780262231817, 9780262731218
- oclc:ocn492601840
- LC Classification:QA269
- Dewey Decimal:519.3
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