Non-propositional intentionality

Non-propositional intentionality

by Grzankowski, Alex Montague, Michelle

Type Book
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"The mind is directed upon the world. There are worldly things that we have beliefs about and things in the world we desire to have happen. We find some things fearsome and others likable. The puzzle of intentionality -- how it is that our minds make contact with the world -- is one of the oldest and most vexed issues facing philosophers. Many contemporary philosophers and cognitive scientists have been attracted to the idea that our minds represent the world. This book explores an important as…

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Title Statements

  • Full title :Non-propositional intentionality / edited by Alex Grzankowski and Michelle Montague.

Summary

"The mind is directed upon the world. There are worldly things that we have beliefs about and things in the world we desire to have happen. We find some things fearsome and others likable. The puzzle of intentionality -- how it is that our minds make contact with the world -- is one of the oldest and most vexed issues facing philosophers. Many contemporary philosophers and cognitive scientists have been attracted to the idea that our minds represent the world. This book explores an important assumption about representation, namely, that when we represent things in the world, we represent them as having properties, and in this way our representations have "propositional" structure. The contributors examine what the commitment to propositionalism amounts to; illuminate why one might find the thesis attractive (or unattractive); and consider ways in which one might depart from propositionalism. The hope is that this will lead towards a more complete understanding of how the mind and world are connected."--

This book explores how our minds represent things in the world, asking whether these representations necessarily have the structure of propositions about the world. The hope is that this will lead towards a more complete understanding of the puzzle of intentionality - how it is that our minds make contact with the world.

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Edition Statements

  • Publication Date:2018.
  • Edition:First edition

Publication Statements

  • Publisher(s):Oxford University Press
  • Place of Publication:Oxford, United Kingdom
  • Language:eng
  • Publication Date:2018.

The Physical Object

  • Description:1 online resource

Edition Identifiers

  • ISBN:9780191046537, 0191046531, 9780191796807, 0191796808
  • oclc:on1045426519
  • LC Classification:B105.I56
  • Dewey Decimal:128.2

Table of Contents

Non-propositional intentionality : an introduction / Alex Grzankowski, Michelle Montague -- Why maps are not propositional / Elisabeth Camp -- Intensional transitive verbs and abstract clausal complementation / Marcel den Dikken, Richard Larson, Peter Ludlow -- Know-how and non-propositional intentionality / Katalin Farkas -- Content and theme in attitude ascriptions / Graeme Forbes -- Relational theory of non-propositional attitudes / Alex Grzankowski -- Sensory disclosure : neither a propositional, nor a factive, attitude / Mark Johnston -- Belief-that and belief-in : which reductive analysis? / Uriah Kriegel -- Propositionalism without propositions, objectualism without objects / Angela Mendelovici -- Attitudes on display / Mark Sainsbury -- Are there non-propositional intentional states? / John R. Searle -- Is attention a non-propositional attitude? / Sebastian Watzl.

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