Norms and necessity

"This book develops a new approach to understanding our claims about what is metaphysically necessary or possible: Modal Normativism. While claims about what is metaphysically necessary or possible have long played a central role in metaphysics and other areas of philosophy, such claims are traditionally thought of as aiming to describe a special kind of modal fact or property, or perhaps facts about other possible worlds. But that assumption leads to difficult ontological, epistemological, and methodological puzzles. Should we accept that there are modal facts or properties, or other possible worlds? If so, what could these things be? How could we come to know what the modal facts or properties are? How can we resolve philosophical debates about what is necessary or possible? The Normativist rejects the assumption that modal claims aim to describe modal features or possible worlds, arguing instead that they serve as useful ways of conveying, reasoning with, and renegotiating semantic rules and their consequences. By dropping the descriptivist assumption, the Normativist is able to unravel the notorious ontological problems of modality, and provide a clear and plausible story about how we can come to know what is metaphysically necessary or possible. Most importantly, this approach helps demystify philosophical methodology. For we are able to see that resolving metaphysical modal questions does not require a special form of philosophical insight or intuition. Instead, it requires nothing more mysterious than empirical knowledge, conceptual mastery, and an ability to explicitly convey and renegotiate semantic rules"--

1. Problems for the Descriptivist Assumption -- 2. Attractions of the Normativist Approach -- 3. Plan of This Book -- 1. Rise and Fall of Early Non-Descriptive Approaches -- 1.1. Pre-History: Challenges for Empiricism -- 1.2. Conventionalism and Its Motives -- 1.3. Criticisms of Conventionalism -- 1.4. Later Non-Descriptivism and the Normative Function of Modal Discourse -- 1.5. Why the Non-Descriptivist Approach Was Lost -- 1. 6. New Barriers to Modal Non-Descriptivism -- 1.7. Non-Descriptivist Revival -- 1.8. Where Do We Go from Here? -- 2. Function of Modal Discourse -- 2.1. Games, Necessities, and the Advantages of Modal Terminology -- 2.2. Function of Metaphysical Modal Terminology -- 2.3. Uses of Metaphysical Modal Claims -- 2.4. How Should We Understand the Semantic Rules? -- 3. Meaning of Modal Discourse -- 3.1. Relation between Function and Use -- 3.2. Content of Modal Terms -- 3.3. Modal Propositions and Modal Truth -- 3.4. Avoiding the Criticisms of Conventionalism -- 3.5. Conclusion -- 4. Handling De Re and A Posteriori Modal Claims -- 4.1. Rules for Names and Natural Kind Terms -- 4.2. De Re Modal Claims -- 4.3. Posteriori Modal Claims -- 4.4. Contingent A Priori -- 4…