Sources of Knowledge

Cover -- Title -- Copyright -- Contents -- Introduction: "But We Can Always Err!"--Part One: Knowledge and Reason -- Chapter I. Finite Knowledge -- 1. Who Are "We"? A Kantian Answer -- 2. Knowledge from the Standpoint of Reason -- 3. The Dogma: Justification without Truth -- 4. The Puzzle: Truth-Guaranteeing Grounds -- Chapter II. Finite Justification -- 1. Agrippa's Trilemma -- 2. Two Answers to Agrippa's Trilemma -- 3. The Category of a Truth-Guaranteeing Ground -- 4. Are We Familiar with Grounds Belonging to This Category? -- 5. The Role of Perceptual Grounds -- Part Two: The Primacy of Knowledge -- Chapter III. Doubting Knowledge -- 1. Objectivity and the Possibility of Error -- 2. The Paradox of Knowledge -- 3. Is Philosophy Necessarily Skeptical? -- Chapter IV. The Dilemma of Epistemology -- 1. The General Redemptive Strategy: Less Is More! -- 2. The Internalist Variant -- 3. The Externalist Variant -- 4. The Paradox Returns -- Chapter V. What Are Grounds? -- 1. The Rigorous Reading: Hume and Kant -- 2. Grounds and Facts -- 3. A Transcendental Argument -- 4. Causality or Normativity: A False Dichotomy -- 5. The Primacy of Knowledge -- Part Three: The Nature of Knowledge -- Chapter VI. Rational Capacities -- 1. The Category of a Rational Capacity -- 2. Rational Capacities as Constitutive Unities -- 3. Habits and Regulative Rules -- 4. The Normativity of Rational Capacities -- 5. Aristotle's Conception of a dynamis meta logou -- 6. Rational Capacities as Self-Conscious, Normative Explanations -- Chapter VII. Rational Capacities for Knowledge -- 1. Knowledge as Rational Capacity -- 2. Knowledge of the Explanation of Knowledge -- 3. Knowledge as Self-Conscious Act -- 4. Knowledge and Non-Accidentality -- Chapter VIII. Rational Capacities and Circumstances -- 1. The Asymmetry of Knowledge and Error -- 2. Favorable and Unfavorable Circumstances

3. Fallible Capacities and Knowledge -- 4. Doxastic Responsibility and Knowledge -- Part Four: The Teleology of Knowledge -- Chapter IX. The Teleology of Rational Capacities -- 1. Virtue Epistemology and "Epistemic Capacities": A Critique -- 2. Rational Capacities as a Species of Teleological Causality: A Kantian Approach -- 3. Kant's Refutation of the Idea of an "Implanted Subjective Disposition"--4. Knowledge as a Self-Constituting Capacity -- Chapter X. Knowledge and Practice -- 1. Rational Capacities and Practice -- 2. How Does One Acquire a Rational Capacity for Knowledge? -- 3. Knowledge and Objectivity -- 4. Skepticism and Philosophy -- Bibliography -- Index