Summary
Economic crises place great pressures on authoritarian regimes. Why do some authoritarian regimes survive economic crises by adopting adjustment policies that their supporters demand, while other authoritarian regimes offer inconsistent adjustment policies and subsequently collapse? This dissertation answers these questions by studying the distributional consequences of adjustment policies to financial crises. Holders of mobile capital advocate capital account openness, while holders of fixed capital and labor advocate capital account closure to facilitate macroeconomic expansion. When support coalitions contain both mobile and fixed capital, contradictory demands over adjustment policy lead regime collapse, but when coalitions including fixed capital or fixed capital in alliance with labor, regimes adopt expansionary policies and survive. Evidence from in-depth field research in Southeast Asia shows how the theory explains enduring puzzles about adjustment and regime transitions in Indonesia and Malaysia during the Asian Financial Crisis. Cross-national statistical research and additional case studies from Latin America demonstrate that the approach explains how coalitional politics affects adjustment policy and regime survival around the world.
Read More ↓Edition Statements
- Publication Date:2007
Thesis Information
- Degree:Ph.D.
- University:Yale University
- Advisor/Supervisor:F. M. Rosenbluth
- Pages:492
Publication Statements
- Language:eng
- Publication Date:2007
Edition Identifiers
- proquest:304784553
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