Immigration and conflict

This study develops a theory explaining variation in the incidence and type of immigrant conflict and tests this theory in Great Britain and Germany. I first develop and disaggregate the concept of contemporary immigrant conflict into two component parts: (i) immigrant-native conflict, or the sustained confrontation between members of the immigrant and the native populations; and (ii) immigrant-state conflict, or the sustained confrontation between immigrant and state actors. The central argument proposed in this dissertation maintains that variation in economic scarcity and immigrant political power in areas of immigrant settlement explains differences in immigrant conflict across time, space, and immigrant groups. Immigrant conflict occurs when there is a shortage of resources desired by both natives and immigrants. When immigrants can back up their claims for scarce economic goods with pivotal votes, incumbents will allocate these resources to this new constituency. Natives are in turn likely to protest such resource allocation by turning against immigrants. Conversely, in the absence of political leverage, immigrants are left with few resources during times of economic shortage. This state of affairs may leave natives content, but is more likely to cause immigrants to engage in conflictual relations with the state. Using archival, historical and quantitative data, the present study will show how national immigration regimes crucially affect levels of economic scarcity and immigrant political power and how these national institutions in turn interact with differences in the local economic and political circumstances in the areas of immigrant settlement to explain variation in on-the-ground immigrant conflict across Germany and Great Britain, and, within Great Britain, across towns over time and across immigrant groups.