Islamic insurgencies: A comparative study

The rise of Islamically-based insurgencies since 1978 has received considerable popular and academic attention. Much of this attention, however, has been somewhat atheoretical, with Islamist insurgencies being treated as a rather unique phenomenon not comparable with other such struggles and with Islamic political opposition movements being viewed as inherently similar to one another. The purpose of this dissertation is to examine Islamically-based insurgencies in light of broader theories of revolutions and insurgencies, and to compare Islamic insurgencies for similarities and differences among them. After examining a number of insurgency and revolutionary theories, the theoretical structure used for examining the case studies consists of four elements for the development of an insurgency. These four elements are an existing significant level of frustration among a segment of a particular population; an ideology that can be used to appeal to this disaffected group; a leadership element to channel popular discontent; and the mobilization of this population. Using this theory, the Iranian Revolution and insurgencies in Egypt, Algeria, Lebanon, Iraq, and the Philippines are examined. Several findings were made from the cases. The theory provides a good fit in explaining the developments in each insurgency studied. Each insurgent movement developed in an environment conducive of creating frustrations and feelings of deprivation among a significant segment of the population. Although Islamic insurgencies obviously have used religion as a basis for mobilization, much of the groups' agendas have centered around addressing solutions to practical economic, social, and political frustrations. The organization and demographics of Islamic insurgencies have been similar to those of other insurgencies. The most significant difference among Islamic insurgent movements has been the role of religious figures. The most successful Shia insurgencies have been marked by a large number of religious figures among the insurgent leadership. Most Sunni insurgencies, on the other hand, have been led by persons not part of the religious establishment, and in fact many such insurgencies have been marked by an anti-religious establishment stance. Finally, a number of failures in organization and mobilization by Islamic insurgent groups have led to a relatively low level of success.