The Political Consequences of Defeats in Wars

In this dissertation, I formulated a theory about the conditions that make defeats in war radicalizing experiences, both domestically and in foreign policy. I present a two-stage model that explores the impact of defeat on the likelihood of domestic radicalization and then show how the resultant domestic political configurations lead to either inward-oriented political movements and moderate foreign policies or outward-oriented revisionist movements and aggressive foreign policies. My research shows that although defeats in wars are humiliating experiences, those sentiments do not necessarily trigger aggressive nationalism, empower radical parties and create revisionist foreign policy. Defeat and the emotions it generates only create a fertile ground for radicalization—a potentiality that will be actualized only if it is filtered through three intervening variables: national self-images (inflated or realistic), political parties (strong or weak), and international opportunities and constraints. More specifically, my theory posits that national self-images are permissible variables that facilitate or obstruct the emergence of domestic radical politics: they are the storehouse of collective memories upon which elites could build their case for radicalism or moderation. The prevalence of inflated national self-images could potentially fire up revenge sentiments and facilitate the rise of radical parties calling for aggressive nationalism and revisionist foreign policy. However, tempered self-images obstruct radicalization. This is so because not all nations are socialized into myths of national power and grandeur, nor do all nations have a history of imperial expansion or a record of cumulative successes and grandiose expectations. A realistic, tempered national self-image makes it harder for predatory elites to recruit into their radical agenda. In addition to the ideational factor of national self-images, I use an institutional variable: political parties/organizations translate the permissibility that national images create into concrete politics. Existing strong political parties obstruct radicalization but weak political ones allow predatory elites to use public fears, insecurities and humiliation sentiments to radicalize the domestic political landscape. This is the first stage of the theory: the radicalization, or lack thereof, of domestic politics. Defeats thus create changes in the configuration of the domestic political landscape, discrediting some ideologies and political parties but elevating others; and those changes then feedback into foreign policies. Domestic radicalization will enhance the chances that a state pursues aggressive/revisionist foreign policies—given that the international environment presents an opportunity for revision or aggression—for even if the state wishes to be revisionist, it must either have the material resources or the support of a major ally. That is, the actual behavior, not the intention, is determined by the presence of opportunities and constraints at the international level. On the other hand, when the domestic political landscape is not sufficiently radicalized, the state could pursue moderate/status quo foreign policies. I test my theory on four case studies, Egypt (1967), Turkey/Ottoman Empire, Hungary and Bulgaria (WWI).