Bernard Berofsky argues that there is room in a deterministic world for a conception of free will as self-determination including the power of genuine choice. He grounds this compatibilist position in a new version of the regularity theory of laws, derived from David Hume's deni…
Bernard Berofsky argues that there is room in a deterministic world for a conception of free will as self-determination including the power of genuine choice. He grounds this compatibilist position in a new version of the regularity theory of laws, derived from David Hume's deni…
Hardly any attempt to come to grips with the classical problem of free will and determinism directly addresses the metaphysical vision driving the concerns of those who believe that a significant sort of free will cannot exist in a deterministic world. Ac.
This book offers a defense of humean compatibilism, which bases the belief in the compatibility of free will and determinism on David Hume's idea that laws do not uphold the existence of necessary connections in nature.
Bernard Berofsky argues that there is room in a deterministic world for a conception of free will as self-determination including the power of genuine choice. He grounds this compatibilist position in a new version of the regularity theory of laws, derived from David Hume's deni…