Mary Leng offers a defense of mathematical fictionalism, according to which we have no reason to believe that there are any mathematical objects. Perhaps the most pressing challenge to mathematical fictionalism is the indispensability argument for the truth of our mathematical t…
Mary Leng defends a philosophical account of the nature of mathematics which views it as a kind of fiction (albeit an extremely useful fiction)
Mary Leng defends a philosophical account of the nature of mathematics which views it as a kind of fiction (albeit an extremely useful fiction).
Mary Leng defends a philosophical account of the nature of mathematics which views it as a kind of fiction (albeit an extremely useful fiction).
"Mary Leng offers a defence of mathematical fictionalism, arguing that we have no reason to believe that there are any mathematical objects. In mounting this defence, she responds to the indispensability argument for the existence of mathematical objects, arguably the most press…
Mary Leng defends a philosophical account of the nature of mathematics which views it as a kind of fiction (albeit an extremely useful fiction).
Mary Leng defends a philosophical account of the nature of mathematics which views it as a kind of fiction (albeit an extremely useful fiction).
Mary Leng defends a philosophical account of the nature of mathematics which views it as a kind of fiction (albeit an extremely useful fiction).