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The standard view of philosophical methodology is that philosophers rely on intuitions as evidence. Herman Cappelen argues that this claim is false, and reveals how it has encouraged pseudo-problems, presented misguided ideas of what philosophy is, and misled exponents of metaph…
Mark Taper, Subhash Lele and an esteemed group of contributors explore the relationships among hypotheses, models, data and interference on which scientific progress rests in an attempt to develop a new quantitative framework for evidence.
An exploration of the statistical foundations of scientific inference, The Nature of Scientific Evidence asks what constitutes scientific evidence and whether scientific evidence can be quantified statistically. Mark Taper, Subhash Lele, and an esteemed group of contributors exp…
Modern science is built on experimental evidence, yet scientists are often very selective in deciding what evidence to use and tend to disagree about how to interpret it. In The Matter of Facts, Gareth and Rhodri Leng explore how scientists produce and use evidence. They do so t…
What is evidence in qualitative inquiry and how is it evaluate? Things defined as true or false in research are strongly influenced by social criteria and by the politics of academia. As a challenge to the dominance of conservative science, qualitative researchers are often vict…
What is evidence in qualitative inquiry and how is it evaluated? The interdisciplinary, international group of contributors to this volume address these questions in an attempt to create evidential criteria for qualitative work.
This book addresses theoretical problems concerning legal evidence. The concept of evidence is expected to fulfill a number of distinct roles in science and philosophy, but also in legal theory and law, some of which are complementary, while others are conflicting. In their prof…
"This is the first edited collection entirely dedicated to non-evidentialist epistemology or non-evidentialism-the controversial view that evidence is not required in order for doxastic attitudes to enjoy a positive epistemic status. Belief or acceptance can be epistemically jus…
