It is often argued that courts are better suited for impartial deliberation than partisan legislatures, and that this capacity justifies handling them substantial powers of judicial review. This title provides a thorough analysis of those claims, introducing the theory of delibe…
It is often argued that courts are better suited for impartial deliberation than partisan legislatures, and that this capacity justifies handling them substantial powers of judicial review. This title provides a thorough analysis of those claims, introducing the theory of delibe…
It is often argued that courts are better suited for impartial deliberation than partisan legislatures, and that this capacity justifies handling them substantial powers of judicial review. This title provides a thorough analysis of those claims, introducing the theory of delibe…
"Contemporary democracies have granted an expansive amount of power to unelected judges that sit in constitutional or supreme courts. This power shift has never been easily squared with the institutional backbones through which democracy is popularly supposed to be structured. T…
"Inspired by the work of Professor Michael Taggart, this collection of essays from across the common law world is concerned with two separate but related themes. First, to what extent and by what means should review on substantive grounds such as unreasonableness be expanded and…
Responding to and building on the work of Professor Michael Taggart, this book brings together essays on two contrasting issues concerning the scope and intensity of substantive grounds of review. Firstly, whether and to what extent review on substantive grounds such as unreason…
"Inspired by the work of Professor Michael Taggart, this collection of essays from across the common law world is concerned with two separate but related themes. First, to what extent and by what means should review on substantive grounds such as unreasonableness be expanded and…