For the first time, the director of the UN's International Atomic Energy Agency and "man in the middle" of the planet's most explosive confrontations speaks out--on his dealings with America, negotiations with Iran, reform and democracy in the Middle East, and the prospects for …
The author gives us his account from the centre of the nuclear fray. Readers will sit at the dinner table with Iraqi officials in Baghdad, listening as they bleakly predict the coming war. They will eavesdrop on the exchanges between UN inspectors and U.S. officials observing th…
The author gives us his account from the centre of the nuclear fray. Readers will sit at the dinner table with Iraqi officials in Baghdad, listening as they bleakly predict the coming war. They will eavesdrop on the exchanges between UN inspectors and U.S. officials observing th…
Robert J. Oppenheimer is among the most contentious and important figures of the twentieth century. As head of the Los Alamos Laboratory, he oversaw the successful effort to beat the Nazis to develop the first atomic bomb - a breakthrough which was to have eternal ramifications …
Robert J. Oppenheimer is among the most contentious and important figures of the twentieth century. As head of the Los Alamos Laboratory, he oversaw the successful effort to beat the Nazis to develop the first atomic bomb - a breakthrough which was to have eternal ramifications …
This text sheds fresh light on developments in British nuclear weapons policy between October 1964, when the Labour Party came back into power under Harold Wilson following a 13 year absence, and June 1970 when the Conservative government of Edward Heath was elected.
The Sword and the Shield reveals for the first time declassified discussions that took place between the British, French and US governments for nuclear cooperation in the early to mid-1970s. In doing so, it sets the scene for the top secret upgrade to Britain's Polaris force, co…
"Despite the global spread of nuclear hardware and knowledge, at least half of the nuclear weapons projects launched since 1970 have definitively failed, and even the successful projects have generally needed far more time than expected. To explain this puzzling slowdown in prol…
"Despite the global spread of nuclear hardware and knowledge, at least half of the nuclear weapons projects launched since 1970 have definitively failed, and even the successful projects have generally needed far more time than expected. To explain this puzzling slowdown in prol…
"Despite the global spread of nuclear hardware and knowledge, at least half of the nuclear weapons projects launched since 1970 have definitively failed, and even the successful projects have generally needed far more time than expected. To explain this puzzling slowdown in prol…
