Human activity is permeated by norms of all sorts: moral norms provide the 'code' for what we ought to do, norms of logic regulate how we ought to reason, scientific norms set the standards for what counts as knowledge, legal norms determine what is lawfully permitted and what i…
"Some goods that we generate for others, as when we give them attention or help or encouragement, require us to provide that benefit under the actual circumstances where we interact. Other goods that we generate require not just that we actually provide that sort of benefit but …
Michael Ridge presents an original expressivist theory of normative judgments which offers distinctive treatments of key problems in metaethics, semantics, and practical reasoning. He argues that normative judgments are hybrid states partly constituted by ordinary beliefs and pa…
"Provides a taxonomy of the array of theories about the nature of so-called normative judgments, and argues for a more expressivist hybrid theory that accommodates both the context-sensitivity of normative predicates and a broadly truth-conditional approach to semantics."
Michael Ridge presents an original expressivist theory of normative judgments which offers distinctive treatments of key problems in metaethics, semantics, and practical reasoning. He argues that normative judgments are hybrid states partly constituted by ordinary beliefs and pa…
Provides a taxonomy of the array of theories about the nature of so-called normative judgments, and argues for a more expressivist hybrid theory that accommodates both the context-sensitivity of normative predicates and a broadly truth-conditional approach to semantics.
Presents what philosophical ethics can be like if freed from the idealizing and reductive pressures of conventional moral theory, making the case that moral imagination is a key part of human virtue by showing the variety of roles it plays in our practical and evaluative lives.-…
Confusion of tongues: a theory of normative language
Can normative words like 'good', 'ought', and 'reason' be defined in entirely non-normative terms? This book argues that they can, advancing an end-relational theory of the meaning of this language as providing the best explanation of the many different ways it is ordinarily use…
"Can normative words like "good," "ought," and "reason" be defined in entirely non-normative terms? Confusion of Tongues argues that they can, advancing a new End-Relational theory of the meaning of this language as providing the best explanation of the many different ways it is…
Can normative words like "good," "ought," and "reason" be defined in entirely non-normative terms? Confusion of Tongues argues that they can, advancing a new End-Relational theory of the meaning of this language as providing the best explanation of the many different ways it is …
Confusion of Tongues: a theory of normative language
"Can normative words like "good," "ought," and "reason" be defined in entirely non-normative terms? Confusion of Tongues argues that they can, advancing a new End-Relational theory of the meaning of this language as providing the best explanation of the many different ways it is…