Kenneth J. Arrow's pathbreaking "impossibility theorem" was a watershed innovation in the history of welfare economics, voting theory, and collective choice, demonstrating that there is no voting rule that satisfies the four desirable axioms of decisiveness, consensus, nondictat…
Kenneth Arrow's pathbreaking?impossibility theorem" was a watershed in the history of welfare economics, voting theory, and collective choice, demonstrating that there is no voting rule that satisfies the four desirable axioms of decisiveness, consensus, nondictatorship, and ind…
A vigorous and healthy system of representative government does not live by competitive elections alone, conclude political scientists from North America and Europe, but also requires transparency and accountability, vigorous party competition, political rights and civil liberti…
In this major new edition the world's leading international scholars have again produced an indispensable guide and up-to-date review of the whole field. Each of the chapters (the majority of which are completely new) provide a broad theoretical and comparative understanding of …
