Complex rationality in conventional deterrence

The origin of this project was a desire to understand better when deterrence succeeds and when it fails. It concentrates on direct deterrence between a challenger and a defender (not including third parties), and on conventional deterrence (not including nuclear deterrence). The "common wisdom" of deterrence suggests that a challenger will be more likely to initiate a militarized dispute, the lower the expected costs of armed conflict. In other words, the challenger will consider the short-term military balance and refrain from an attack if inferior militarily. Conventional deterrence differentiates between capabilities and intentions. This research suggests that capabilities and intentions are closely related and a complete distinction might lead to wrong conclusions. The framework suggests an easier, more applicable and accurate model explaining if and when deterrence might fail, as well as if and when it might succeed. The model entails some reference to capabilities and intentions. However, it does not rely on them solely, because of the very obvious lessons of history. Military superiority is not a sufficient mechanism for deterrence success. The model suggested concentrates on different measures of rationality that should be taken into consideration for deterrence to succeed. It introduces the concept of complex rationality which focus on short-term versus long-term prospects combined with a different set of value prioritization Three case-studies are examined: the Egyptian-Israeli Yom Kippur War of 1973 (deterrence failure), the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor 1941 (deterrence failure), and the Syrian-Israeli relationship during the 1982 war in Lebanon (deterrence success). The last chapter includes a section that analyzes the prospects for a future war or peace between Israel and Syria. The project concludes in stating that a change in our way of thinking about strategic matters is overdue.