I develop and argue for a new intentionalist theory of the speech act of singular reference. Specifically, I propose a Gricean theory of pragmatic competence within which referential competence can be identified and explained. I argue that combining insights from theories of mec…
Many interested reader will have put aside a work by Edith Stein due to its seeming inaccessibility, with the awareness that there was something important there for a future occasion. This collection of essays attempts to provide an idea of what this important something might be…
"In Self-Knowledge and Resentment, Akeel Bilgrami argues that self-knowledge of our intentional states is special among all the knowledges we have because it is not an epistemological notion in the standard sense of that term, but instead is a fallout of the radically normative …
"In Self-Knowledge and Resentment, Akeel Bilgrami argues that self-knowledge of our intentional states is special among all the knowledges we have because it is not an epistemological notion in the standard sense of that term, but instead is a fallout of the radically normative …
"It's time we choose joy over fear. Empowerment over anxiety. JOMO over FOMO. How do we get there? By taking up good burdens. The things we're most proud of in life--the child we're raising; the marathon we completed; the major project we hit out of the park--these required all …
Evolving Enactivism" argues that cognitive phenomena - perceiving, imagining, remembering -- can be best explained in terms of an interface between contentless and content-involving forms of cognition. Building on their earlier book Radicalizing Enactivism, which proposes that t…
"Evolving Enactivism" argues that cognitive phenomena - perceiving, imagining, remembering -- can be best explained in terms of an interface between contentless and content-involving forms of cognition. Building on their earlier book Radicalizing Enactivism, which proposes that …
An extended argument that cognitive phenomena -- perceiving, imagining, remembering -- can be best explained in terms of an interface between contentless and content-involving forms of cognition
Evolving Enactivism argues that cognitive phenomena--perceiving, imagining, remembering--can be best explained in terms of an interface between contentless and content-involving forms of cognition. Building on their earlier book Radicalizing Enactivism, which proposes that there…
by Hutto, Daniel D., Myin, Erik
fromMIT Press Ser
Evolving Enactivism" argues that cognitive phenomena - perceiving, imagining, remembering -- can be best explained in terms of an interface between contentless and content-involving forms of cognition. Building on their earlier book Radicalizing Enactivism, which proposes that t…
