Although the modern economy and society is knowledge intensive, Anna Grandori argues that the dominant economic, organizational and behavioural models neglect to a large extent the problem of valid knowledge construction and effective knowledge governance. This book revisits the…
Conflicting Values of Inquiry explores how certain non-epistemic values had been turned into epistemic ones, how they had an effect on epistemic content, and how they became ideologies of knowledge playing various roles in inquiry and application throughout early modern Europe.
Conflicting Values of Inquiry explores how certain non-epistemic values had been turned into epistemic ones, how they had an effect on epistemic content, and how they became ideologies of knowledge playing various roles in inquiry and application throughout early modern Europe.
Historical research in previous decades has done a great deal to explore the social and political context of early modern natural and moral inquiries. Particularly since the publication of Steven Shapin and Simon Schaffer's Leviathan and the Air-Pump (1985) several studies have …
Conflicting Values of Inquiry explores how certain non-epistemic values had been turned into epistemic ones, how they had an effect on epistemic content, and how they became ideologies of knowledge playing various roles in inquiry and application throughout early modern Europe.
Historical research in previous decades has done a great deal to explore the social and political context of early modern natural and moral inquiries. Particularly since the publication of Steven Shapin and Simon Schaffer's Leviathan and the Air-Pump (1985) several studies have …
Conflicting Values of Inquiry explores how certain non-epistemic values had been turned into epistemic ones, how they had an effect on epistemic content, and how they became ideologies of knowledge playing various roles in inquiry and application throughout early modern Europe.
"Epistemological theories of knowledge and justification draw a crucial distinction between one's simply having good reasons for some belief, and one's actually basing one's belief on good reasons. While the most natural kind of account of basing is causal in nature-a belief is …
